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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court erred in dismissing Petitioner's Petition for failing to state a
prime afacie case for factual innocence. Petitioner has clearly shown sufficient facts
upon which a finding of factual innocence could be made. Even the Trial Court
concedes \: - u . <-e c •, k.oncj 'makes 1...: . •* i>; ..^ii Petitioner committed the crime".

case before that factual innoceiice.
The State argues that some or most of the evidence presented was known to
Defendant and/or his counsel at the time of Trial, but was not properly presented to
l

the Jury. The State incorrectly maintains that only evidence not known to Defendant
or his counsel at the time of Trial may be presented here. The original conviction has
no legal effect, having been reversed; and all evidence of innocence must be
presented and considered.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS MADE A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FACTUAL INNOCENCE
The State, in its Statement of Facts, referred to the robbery and the trial. As to
that trial, the State made the following statement (St. Br. P.7):
In closing argument, the State pointed out that, although Miller was living in
Louisiana at the time of the robbery, nobody could account for his whereabouts
between November 28,2000, andDecember 13,2000. The State explained that
this time gap allowed Miller time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit his brother,
commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana. The State also noted that the
effects of Miller's stroke were likely mild as he was released from the hospital
after only four (4) days. (Page Citations Omitted).
At trial, the State presented a case which contained a two (2) week gap during
which Mr. Miller could have come to Utah, ostensibly to visit his brother. Since that
time, the gap has substantially narrowed. It is true that Judge McCleve, on remand
from the Court of Appeals, heard additional evidence which did not impress her as
sufficient to alter the results. She was still not impressed by the evidence presented
2

presented to the Jury was reduced substantial!)/ ; by good, fin n evidence ft omaCoi irt
proceeding in Louisiana, and the notes and verified statement of the home care nurse.
The trial judge, in her ruling of September 30,2008, backed off substantially from her
previous ruling, but ended up with the same decision:
Although the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed the crime,
the Court reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the court of appeals
and determined that there was "no reasonable probability of a different
outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified." (Emphasis added).
That statemei it is now inten ial 1) ' ii icoi isistent to tl le point tl ial: itcai mot si istain
the Trial Court's ruling. If "the evidence makes it unlikely that Petitioner committed
the crime" there is a substantial "probability of a different outcome at trial." That, of
course, was acknowledged by the Salt Lake District Attorney in his decision not to
prosecute further. I 'he State, (St. Br. 31) points out that even a "not guilty" verdict
(\\ •: •.

.:* • •

:.;inic as acukii innocence. The jurv couui :,a\e .v;iewju me

doubt. In this case, the ti ial ji ldge foi ii id tl lat it is ii n ilikel} " tl lat Defendant
committed the crime. That is far stronger than the existence of a reasonable doubt;
and Defendant suggest that it approaches the "clear and convincing" standard of

3

innocence close enough to defeat a motion under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
POINT II
IT IS NOT SIGNIFICANT THAT SOME OF THE EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE
WAS AVAILABLE, OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE AT THE ORIGINAL
TRIAL
In Point II of its Brief, the State contends that the fact that Defendant's
conviction was reversed on appeal, and that there was no retrial, is not evidence of
actual innocence. The State goes on the quote the Senator who sponsored the
legislation under which this action is brought: "the mere fact that the prisoner has
been released from jail does not establish the right to have a claim under this fund."
The State goes on to say "cases are frequently reversed or dismissed for reasons that
have nothing to do with whether the defendant is factually innocent." While that may
well be true, this is not such an instance. It is extremely important that the
foundations for the State's case, which resulted in a guilty verdict at trial, have since
been severely eroded. Under those circumstances, it is not important whether defense
counsel knew, should have known, or might have known, more about possible
defenses at the time of trial. It is not important to note that he was not found to have
been ineffective, in a constitutional sense, upon remand from the Court of Appeals.
4

near enough evidence to have convicted Defendant of the 11 h o c charged. Whether 11le
State wants to admit it iii its Brief; the State has previously so admitted it by its
actions in stipulating to a reversal ai id in refusing to retry the case. The example
previously cited, new evidence which severely restricts the window \

• 1rich

Defendant could have been absent from tiic Male oi Louisiana, is but one example.
'Ihi1 Si id

111 ill

illiiul! .iflat'L'i ,\|i|irll,iiil

i, nlnidh n lh.il I In: i;r

nitness

iilcntilicatioii has simv also been se\ riv|y disnumlnl. ( hi paj^e 2h jixl ?. / ol ills Brief,
the State contends that the concessions of the prosecutor on the eye witness testimony
are insignificant. That Brief refers to evidence that one of the eye witnesses had
identified the perpetrator of the crime as someone "who came into the store once in
a while." The State goes on to say "petitioner apparently believes that the eye witness
mi ist be mistaken, because a; uu ia,,e . i ' e enme, petitioner was living in

Attorney assigned to this case (one of the senior Deputy Prosecutors in the office)
found this to be a compelling reason not to prosecute further. It is true, of course, that
"the fact that the Deputy District Attorney had some questions about this witnesses
5

[sic] identification of petitioner as a customer does not establish that petitioner is
innocent." (St. Br. 26-27). But the State is simply misstating the facts, when it
prefaces this statement by saying: "The credibility of the victim's eyewitness
testimony has never been questioned by the State." (St. Br. 26). That evidence, given
two years after the robbery, was never strong enough to convict without some
corroboration. The victim testified that the police report which stated that she had
described her assailant as "between eighteen and twenty-one years old" must have
been a mistake.(St. Br. 4). (Oops!) The prosecuting attorney's concerns over the
reliability of the eyewitness testimony were sufficient to cause the charges to be
dropped. It adds another nail in the coffin of the case. If the eye witness identification
is considered unreliable; and if Defendant can be shown to have been in Louisiana
for most of the time at issue, there is no longer any case for guilt. In its statement of
facts, the State seeks to make "sense" of the thin ice its case rests upon by stating in
a footnote (St. Br. 23) that "Petitioner also ignores the fact that, in addition to stealing
the woman's purse, he also tried to steal her car - perhaps in order to drive back to
Louisiana". The State elsewhere alleges, of course, that the only way that Defendant
could have been in Utah on the day of the robbery, and in Louisiana just before and
just after, was by flying. (St. Br. 22). Such a suggestion only underlines the
6

flimsiness of the State's position at this time.
The State combines its arguments that there is insufficient evidence of
innocence, with its argument that Defendant must "show that the information
regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the time of the original
trial5'. Defendant contends that if the evidence of innocence is sufficient, and if there
is no standing conviction, it does not matter what was known at the time of trial. This
statute treads a thin line. It seeks to compensate someone who was incarcerated for
a crime that he did not commit; and it seeks to avoid compensating someone whose
conviction is set aside because of Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations, or some
other "constitutional technicality". But the State has wound itself up in procedural
red tape. What is most important here is that Defendant was incarcerated for four and
a half years for a crime that the trial Court concedes that "it [is] unlikely that
petitioner committed". Petitioner is not asking this Court to enter a finding of factual
innocence. He is merely asking the Court to order an evidentiary hearing at which all
of the evidence, as it stands now, can be weighed, and in which Defendant stands a
chance of being found factually innocent. Defendant has indeed stated a cause of
action, and this matter should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b). It is not
important, as the State argues (St. Br. 18-19) that some of the evidence was known
7

to Defendant's trial counsel, but was not presented fully at trial. If there had been a
second trial, Defendant could have presented all available evidence, and would not
have been constrained by the first trial. Because the conviction now has no legal
standing, all evidence available may be presented. If the evidence points to factual
innocence, compensation must be awarded.
The State claims that the statutory language is "plain and unambiguous" in
requiring the Defendant to jump through ah hoops of procedure. But it makes
absolutely no sense to suggest that Defendant must prove that his original trial
counsel was ineffective in order to obtain the chance now to prove his innocence.
Whether or not his original trial counsel was ineffective, the conviction did not stand.
Whether or not his trial counsel was ineffective, the State refused to even make an
attempt at a second conviction. Whether or not his trial counsel was ineffective, the
trial Judge, who ruled that evidence presented to her on remand was insufficient to
raise "reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial" has now conceded that
"The evidence makes it unlikely that petitioner committed the crime". The State
concedes (St. Br. 34) that it earlier stipulated to the reversal of the conviction because
"there was an error in the trial proceedings and that the interests ofjustice dictate that
the defendant receive a new trial". This was after the trial judge had found no such
8

errors. The concession by the State was as major statement to the effect that the trial
court had erred. It must be read to call into question the trial court's remand ruling;
but the State concedes nothing. Whatever the "error" might have been (which
remains a mystery, it seems), it was sufficient to reverse the conviction. Now the
State seems to be claiming that there were no serious errors in the trial proceeding.,
at least not one sufficient to warrant a new evidentiary hearing on factual innocence.
That position is untenable.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's ruling that there is insufficient cause to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the Petition is neither factually nor legally sound, and this Court should
order such a hearing to be held. Since it has been conceded that the trial proceedings
contained a serious error sufficient to reverse the conviction, and since the trial judge
does not appear to recognize the error, a new district court judge should be appointed
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to hear this matter from a fresh viewpoint.
DATED this \zj_ day of June, 2009.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGHJL.L.C.

Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellant
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